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ABSTRACT 
In this article we discuss the specificity and importance of the idea of theology of 
science proposed by the philosopher and theologian Michał Heller. The salient features of 
the definition of this discipline are summarily reconstructed, explaining the main themes 
that the theology of science would deal with and presenting some objections to this 
definition. It is emphasized that the theology of science, especially in the case of the 
contingency of the world and of its intelligibility, can consider the limits of the empirical 
method. Moreover, methodological aspects of the discipline are discussed in the context 
of different representations of the science-theology relationship, highlighting the scope 
and the limits of the theology of science. Above two approaches are analysed: the 
methodological model of separation (isolationism), and the anti-separationist model 
(interactionism). It is noted that the theology of science could be a particular type of 
inductive metaphysics, which works on scientific and theological extrapolations. 
Therefore, in the theology of science, the special task for philosophy would be making 
more clear the speculative space within which to carry out the mediation between science 
and theology. At the end some epistemological observations and proposals are made for 
the further development of the discipline. All this would imply the need for the elaboration 
of hypothetical theology that would help in the study of the new theological problems. 
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En este artículo discutimos la especificidad e importancia de la idea de la teología 
de la ciencia propuesta por el filósofo y teólogo Michał Heller. Se reconstruyen 
sumariamente los rasgos más destacados de la definición de esta disciplina, explicando 
los principales temas que trataría la teología de la ciencia y presentando algunas 
objeciones a esta definición. Se hace hincapié en que la teología de la ciencia, 
especialmente en el caso de la contingencia del mundo y de su inteligibilidad, puede 
considerar los límites del método empírico. Además, los aspectos metodológicos de la 
disciplina se examinan en el contexto de diferentes representaciones de la relación entre 
ciencia y tecnología, poniendo de relieve el alcance y los límites de la teología de la 
ciencia. Se analizan dos enfoques: el modelo metodológico de separación 
(aislacionismo) y el modelo antiseparacionista (interaccionismo). Se señala que la 
teología de la ciencia podría ser un tipo particular de metafísica inductiva, que trabaja 
sobre extrapolaciones científicas y teológicas. Por lo tanto, en la teología de la ciencia, 
la tarea especial de la filosofía sería hacer más claro el espacio especulativo en el que 
llevar a cabo la mediación entre la ciencia y la teología. Al final se hacen algunas 
observaciones y propuestas epistemológicas para el desarrollo ulterior de la disciplina. 
Todo ello implicaría la necesidad de la elaboración de una hipotética teología que 
ayudaría al estudio de los nuevos problemas teológicos. 





Some authors pay attention to the fact that modern theology follows the 
growing specialization of the various disciplines (e.g. theology of liberation, of 
ecology, etc.), which could lead to the risk of depriving theological reflection 
its proper content (Roszak 2014; Woźniak 2007). In this context, we will 
consider the value and necessity of the idea of theology of science proposed by 
Michał Heller (Tarnów, 1936-), a polish philosopher, who is known as a 
physicist and cosmologist, but also as a philosopher of nature, physics and as 
well an expert in the field of Science and Religion. He received the Templeton 
Prize in 2008 (Heller 2008a). 
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The problem of establishing what type of relations exist between theology 
and science is a very serious one which has been present in European thought 
for many centuries. Considering the high degree of interest in the empirical-
mathematical and technological sciences in Western culture, it can also be 
defined as existential, because of splitting the intellectual life into two polar 
groups: humanistic and scientific. In fact it seems that we are now far from those 
epochs in which theology dominated (guided) other disciplines. Today it seems 
that theology and science often demarcate their areas of research by professing 
“a pact of non-intervention”. This situation probably arose due to the strong 
criticism (starting from modern times) of that intermediary between science and 
theology which had before been represented by metaphysics (Koyré 2018). 
Consequently, if theology and science remain separated, this discord requires a 
type of reflection especially from philosophy and science-engaged theology. As 
emphasized by Lambert, philosophy can and should play the role of the 
hermeneutics of scientific results that traces the common ground between 
science and theology, exploring the boundaries of concepts and making them 
usable within theology (Lambert 1999, 126-130; Lambert 2002, 13-15). 
This paper contends that the analysis of scientific realism can uncover 
implications for the theology of science program as proposed by Michał Heller. 
The starting point is the ongoing lively debate between realism and antirealism 
amid the philosophy of science. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
in detail the various problems linked to this debate, but it is sufficient to note 
that, according to the core idea of many philosophers of science, continuous 
development of science would speak towards a realistic interpretation of 
scientific theories. It is commonly thought that the most powerful argument 
towards scientific realism is the no miracles argument, “according to which the 
success of science would be miraculous if scientific theories were not at least 
approximately true descriptions of the world” (Ladyman 2014). Despite the 
underdetermination argument, frequently quoted as providing a basis for 
scepticism towards the unobservable entities theory, probably the strongest 
arguments against scientific realism are so called historical objections, of which 
the most widely known is the pessimistic meta-induction (Pietsch 2011). 
Ontological discontinuity, seen in consequent scientific theories, seems to give 
the foundation not only for mere agnosticism but for a positive belief, i.e. that 
many of the core theoretical terms of today’s scientific theories will be 
considered obsolete in the future. This is an induction-based reasoning that our 
current best theories will be substituted by new theories and consequently, some 
of the core theoretical terms of today’s best theories will be substituted by others. 
That is why the question of approximate truth discovery and an ontological 
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reference of theoretical terms from our best current theories would be subjected 
to doubt (Alai 2017).  
Even if there is no unanimous agreement on the “form” of realism among 
those who defend standard realism in the face of historical objections, some 
form of philosophical (or theological) realism could remain undisputed by the 
theory of discontinuity. On the other hand, science-engaged theology is 
interested in the issue of realism, because in the theological perspective, the 
world is God’s work and in some way it reflects God’s goodness and wisdom 
(Strumiłowski 2019). It seems that because in the context of contemporary 
philosophy of science, the problem of ontological discontinuity of scientific 
theories is widely discussed, one would need a possible heuristic role for the 
theology of science in this debate. In other words, the theological attempt to 
complete a philosophical discussion around the problem of temporality of 
science, would be based on some theological assumptions deriving from the 
understanding the world as the Work of God and on the analysis of the 
ontological image of the world present in the philosophical and theological 
thought. Thus in this context arises a question about the principal 
theological/philosophical assumption of rationality of science and the world 
(Heller 2006). 
 
II. THE THEOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
1. FOUNDATION OF DIALOGUE 
In the light of the above mentioned “pact of non-intervention” and 
opportunities that are arising from an ongoing lively debate between realism and 
antirealism amid the philosophy of science, it should be noted that, according to 
Heller’s philosophy, theology and science have always been intertwined and the 
strong demarcation between them had, as history shows, a negative effect on 
both (Heller 1987a; Heller 2008b, 21-23, 49-53; Heller 2014, 41-120; Pedersen 
1990, 139-160; Pedersen 1997). As a common denominator for the possibility 
of dialogue between the disciplines, Heller considers the question of rationality, 
or the mystery of the intelligibility (comprehensibility) of the world (Heller 
2015a). 
It can be noted that from the theological point of view, the created world is 
impregnated with a sense (meaning) and values. To avoid confusion, Heller 
proposes that we use the term “meaning” in reference to linguistic expressions, 
and the term “sense” referring to extralinguistic objects. He explains that we 
ascribe sense to objects (“sense for someone”), where sense becomes a type of 
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value (with certain epistemic aspect). Heller points out that mathematical 
structures have a syntactic meaning, but when they are used for modelling the 
world they also evoke a semantic sense. We can therefore speak not only of the 
sense of certain models, but also of the sense of whole theories. In this way, 
scientists can speak of the harmony or beauty of mathematical structures, or 
indeed, of all science. Because theories address some aspects of the world, one 
may also speak of the sense of the Universe. This sense would consist in the 
harmony of the world and in the fact that the world can be studied by the 
mathematical method. Heller points out that his reasoning is two-fold: 1) we 
attribute to the world sense on the basis of the empirical method; 2) the universe 
looks like a harmonious Totality, which is knowable. Moreover, Heller shows 
that in our days there is a widespread debate on epistemic values in science (e.g. 
consistency, concordance with empirical data, simplicity, mathematical 
elegance). However, in the theological perspective, this sense and these values 
would find their foundation in the divine Logos (Sense) (Heller 1997; Heller 
2007; Heller 2008b, 168-208). We note that all science is based on the idea of 
some kind of rationality and stability of nature. Thus it seems that the theme of 
Logos and rationality can create bridges between the sciences and theology/ 
philosophy. 
Even if Heller does not address in any deep way the philosophical 
problematic of sense and values, it seems that the proposal of Lambert, with his 
idea of the articulation of theology and science on the ontological (where the 
key concept would be the final cause and the problem of being), epistemological 
(with the central question of metaphysical presuppositions of science and the 
search for unity and the sense of nature) and ethical level (the critical reflection 
on the ethical implications of scientific activity) (Lambert 1999, 106-125), could 
be seen as the right direction to continue what Heller first outlined. In this way 
theology could “help to interpret the intelligibility of nature as a sign of a gift 
received, a manifestation of its very purpose: to understand that unique is the 
Foundation of what is visible and invisible, that unique is the reference to a 
Subject in relation with the Cosmos” (Marcacci 2018a, 163). 
 
2. THE CORE IDEA OF THE THEOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
Michał Heller presented the foundations of the theology of science project 
in his book Nowa fizyka i nowa teologia (Heller 2014, 150-154), based on ideas 
which he formulated in the 1980s. In fact, the first publication that explained 
this concept was the post-congress text of his friend and collaborator Josef 
Życiński, after the Second Interdisciplinary Seminary at Castel Gandolfo in 
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1982 (Życiński 1984, 85). Basically, Heller describes theology of science as a 
theological afterthought on sciences, which would examine consequences of the 
fact that empirical sciences research the world created by God.  
In the starting point of his thought, this polish cosmologist emphasized that 
the universe of science is merely a part of the universe of theology, which means 
that the material world, from a theological perspective, is richer than the same 
world as seen from the perspective of empirical sciences, because theology can 
make statements on the “material world” which do not fit within the limits of 
empirical method. This means that the theology of science should look at 
science through the eyes of a well-informed theologian. Theology of science 
should be a part of the theology of values (sense), and use results from the 
philosophy of science. It would not have a directly apologetic character, but 
would rather aim at the enrichment of the perception of science, taking into 
consideration those aspects that are only visible using the theological method 
(Heller 2015b, 13-18; Heller 2016, 311-312). 
Therefore, as suggested by Szczurek, one can describe the theology of 
science as a theological discipline which interprets scientific research results, as 
developed by philosophy of science, in the light of details of Revelation and the 
final objective of man (Szczurek 2015, 133-134). As a consequence, the material 
matter of theology of science would be the existence of sciences, their basic 
tenants, methods and results; its formal matter – relation of such defined object 
with transcendence, the meaning that results from it concerning God and man. 
Bugajak clarifies that the project of the theology of science would be an attempt 
to refine and deepen a discourse present in a field called Science and Religion 
(Bugajak 2015, 145-146). This deals with pointing out implications that the 
content of scientific theories can bring towards theology and religion. 
Meanwhile, a theology of science would be a theological reflexion on meta-
objective aspects of science among which one can be described as 
methodological (way of practising science) and the other one as “existential” 
(the fact of existence of science as a way of gaining knowledge). 
On the way towards the implementation of this discipline, remarks from 
Dadaczyński are particularly helpful (Dadaczyński 2015, 76-79). He lists some 
elements characteristic for the theology of science. Firstly, the theology of 
science embraces the assumptions of theology (i.e. it refers to theological 
sources pointed out by Melchior Cano) and if it is articulated in a catholic 
environment, it is to be supervised by the Magisterium of Church. Secondly, it 
is a reflection performed at a meta-level. The need to perform a theology of 
science on meta-scientific level results from the fact that on such level one can 
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reflect on some of the aspects of scientific cognition. This level can be conceived 
of as supplementary to philosophy of science in its ontological layer. In fact, 
since science uses mathematical and empirical methods and theology uses 
natural language, this means that statements from science are not directly 
transferred onto a level of theology of science but can be subject to philosophical 
analysis from within a theology of science. Thirdly, it is advisable to assume 
that a theology of science will provide a fresh view on certain problems, rather 
than attempting to build a new theological system. It may be necessary, in 
analyses of theology of science, to call upon theological hypotheses. 
 
3. THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF THE THEOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
As highlighted by Heller, the philosophy of science analyses the limits of 
possibilities for empirical inquiry, but due to its nature, it cannot transcend these 
limits. Meanwhile theology of science, especially in the context of the two 
features of the world, would be able to look at the empirical limits from the other 
side so to speak, the side not accessible by sciences. The first of these features 
is the contingency of the world, that is, its existence as being dependent upon 
the Creator. The other one is the fact that world is full of values in regard to 
which empirical method is generally insensitive. 
As pointed out by Heller, if the key issues investigated by theology of 
science should be the issue of theological concept of the creation of the world 
(Heller 1987b; Heller 2014, 157-161), a question then arises on how the 
theology of creation, which undoubtedly uses metaphysical models for 
expressing content of the Revelation, could be enhanced by calling upon the 
scientific data? Although theology is a reflexion on the content of the Revelation 
and not on science, such reflexion has to be performed in the context of 
understanding created by science. Moreover, if theology is supposed to have an 
anthropological value, it cannot resign from dialogue with science, which is one 
of the necessary conditions for understanding man. Since previous metaphysical 
enquiries were based mainly on common experience, it seems that in the context 
of the development of science which touches subjects like the ontology of 
quantum and sub-quantum areas, there is a need for new reflections regarding 
current metaphysical views.  
Moreover, the problem of the rationality of the world, which is the feature 
that enables rational research, is strictly connected to the theology of creation. 
Theological reflection can investigate this question on its own, although a 
theology of science can be introduced in order to undertake the subject of 
“God’s plan” in the creation, which is fundamental for theology of creation. 
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The problem of the rationality of science is closely linked to the previous 
issue of the rationality of the world. In other words, it seems appropriate that the 
theology of science tries to answer more explicitly the question “why should we 
do science?”. From the theological point of view, man is a mortal being, but 
called to eternity, so theology assigns to man a certain teleology of existence 
(salvation). This is why theology can formulate certain teleological judgments 
on science. Science plays an auxiliary role for man, that he may dominate the 
earth (Genesis 1,28). It seems, therefore, that the main objective of science is 
not only to know the truth as such, but also to rule the world (pragmatic aspect) 
(Olszewski 2015, 98-99). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
1. METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS 
In this section various representations of the science-theology relationship 
will be reviewed by highlighting the scope and limits of the theology of science 
(Russell 2002). Polak, in his discussion of the method of theology of science, in 
reference to Barbour’s classic systematization, suggested that in case of 
theology of science, it is relevant to analyse two approaches: methodological 
separation model (isolationism) which assumes a methodological difference 
between theology and nature sciences which results in the independence of both 
sciences; and anti-separationistic model (interactionism) which hopes to create 
a theological method which would accept some of the elements of nature 
sciences method (Barbour 1997, 77-136; Polak 2015, 25-29). In case of the 
program of theology of science, two essential questions arise: how is it possible 
to break barriers between the disciplines (discordism) and how is it possible to 
avoid extreme integrationism (concordism)? 
From an interaction point of view, Heller and Życiński maintain the 
existence of a common ground between theology and nature sciences. 
According to Heller, theology and science have the same area of interest, the 
Universe, however they see it in a different way. As such, science would act as 
locus theologicus, pointing to interconnection between theology of science and 
science. Moreover, theology of science would show the world as existing 
through dependence upon the Creator and allow for approaching its axiological 
dimension. According to Polak, Heller did not clarify why the reflexion upon 
values should be done by theology and not by philosophy. In other words, is it, 
according to Heller, only theology that can deliver substantiation of axiology of 
nature? (Polak 2015, 29-35). 
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Macek proposed an interpretation of the program of theology of science in 
an interdisciplinary spirit (Macek 2010; Macek 2011). For Życiński, who 
assumes an anti-separationistic view, the area of integration should be 
philosophical reflection, which points to transdisciplinary activity. It is hard to 
ascertain whether Heller’s view of theology of science is more similar to 
multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary action (Polak 2015, 35-40). 
Turek, on the other hand, describes Heller’s views as efforts towards 
assimilation of theology as a science, both in terms of research methodology and 
conceptual apparatus, as well as standards of cognitively valuable knowledge 
(Turek 2001). Turek, unlike Heller, looks for an opportunity to guarantee the 
impact of the natural sciences on theology, at the same time assuming their 
epistemological and methodological separateness. According to Turek a 
confirmation of the separatist vision can be seen in the success of the natural 
sciences, that is to say, in the process of growing autonomy of different 
knowledge disciplines at the beginning of modern times. Polak suggests that 
from the standpoint of the separation model, we have a number of reasons to not 
sacrifice a well-developed methodology. Indeed, there is no already formulated 
and tested method that could replace the current one and the choice of an 
unverified methodology instead of a well-functioning one does not seem 
justified. Moreover, overcoming the barriers would perhaps mean resuming the 
physical-theology program and the risk of the argument “God of the gaps” 
(Oleksowicz 2014). 
Polak clarifies that the theology of science in separationistic spirit would be 
a specific philosophical meta-reflection on science and theology. It would 
therefore be part of philosophy, but its subject matter would come both from 
theology and science and its goal would be to come up with bridging 
interpolations, connecting views of the worlds of science and theology. It would 
be a specific type of induction metaphysics operating on extrapolations of 
scientific and theological knowledge. It would differ from classic metaphysics 
by its tentative conclusions and the need of their constant revision; it would be 
similar to classic ontology through generally seeking knowledge and having the 
objective to deliver a consistent, rational view of the world. Its theological 
character would be decided by the fact of using the Revelation (developed as a 
theological view of the world) as a source of data (Polak 2015, 51-54). Therefore, 
a theology of science, by working through the contact point of views of the 
world built around different notional constructs, could critically investigate the 
philosophical foundations of science and theology, pointing out essential 
differences in assumptions and notional constructs. 
764                                                                                                   MICHAŁ OLEKSOWICZ 
 
CAURIENSIA, Vol. XV (2020) 755-770, ISSN: 1886-4945 – EISSN: 2340-4256 
 
2. OBJECTIONS AND QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
After providing a preliminary definition of the theology of science, its 
principal issues and some methodological caveats, some objections and 
questions emerge. 
As seen in the case of an interactionist paradigm, the theology of science 
becomes an interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary branch, the status of which is not 
so clear. Polak suggests that considerations on theology of science within a 
separationistic model should begin with pointing out specific problems that it is 
supposed to consider. An essential problem would likely be a confrontation 
between the view of the world as presented by nature sciences with theology’s 
view of the world. The idea of the world can be understood as a hermeneutical 
category, that is, a complete vision of general beliefs about man, the world and 
knowledge; a type of specific intellectual background, a specific knowledge of 
all types of cognitive behaviour of human beings (Liana 2010, 71). On the other 
hand, an important problem is the issue of view of the world itself, i.e. it is 
difficult today to show one coherent view of the world provided by the sciences. 
The specialization of the sciences and fragmentariness of proposed views of the 
world is problematic (Polak 2015, 47-51). What answer could the theology of 
science give to the problem of the fragmentariness of science and partial views 
of the world? Could different ontologies proposed within philosophical 
reflection upon particular sciences form the basis for both theology and science 
interpretation? As it was explained, one of the possible strategies of the 
development of the theology of sciences suggests that it should be a type of 
meta-scientific (and meta-theological) reflection. In this context, the theology 
of science would be understood as an activity on a meta-level, whose subject 
would be providing notional constructs of science and theology, and its essential 
target would be to individuate elements of the scientific view of the world that 
could be accepted as potentially serving towards uncontradiction of views of the 
world of theology and science (Polak 2015, 44-47; Strumiłowski 2019). 
Furthermore, if we are considering that a program for the theology of 
science would lead to an attempt at evaluating contemporary scientific efforts 
from a theological point of view, questions arise such as whether theology is 
open to external content coming from current view of the world and if so, how 
such and opening is to be understood? Can one give a positive answer to 
postulate of assimilation of scientific data in theological analysis? (Mścisławski 
2015). 
In contemporary science, the question of the dependence of ontological 
conclusions upon physical theories, which are subject to relatively quick 
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changes, is widely discussed. Therefore, an analysis of the temporality of 
science and the dynamics of its development seems to be very important 
(anticumulativism, cumulativism). One can, however, ask if the variability of 
scientific theories and extremes of their philosophical interpretations would 
essentially make it impossible to work out coherent views, and moreover block 
building another layer of theology of science upon science and its philosophy? 
(Janusz 2015). Would it therefore make any sense to build theological 
conclusions upon such a volatile foundation of ontological analysis? 
 It seems that an intermediary layer of dialogue between sciences and 
theology should use the achievements of philosophy of science and philosophy 
of mathematics, considering the fact that mathematical tools are today often the 
only possible means of scientific exploration. In regard to completion of 
ontology of science, Dadaczyński suggests that the development of theology of 
science could be a completion of ontology of mathematics (Dadaczyński 2015). 
In this context, this would essentially mean discussing the relations between 
universe of mathematical objects and God. Mathematics itself does not take on 
the problem of existence and nature of mathematical objects (extreme realism, 
conservative realism, conceptualism) – they are the subject of philosophy of 
mathematics. Einstein wrote that “without  belief in internal harmony of the 
world there could not be any science. Foundation of any scientific research is a 
conviction that the world is an orderly and understandable entity, which is a 
religious belief” (Einstein 2001). Therefore, the question arises if the belief 
about the uniformity of nature or its mathematicality, which is the basis for any 
research, is founded on theological ideas? It seems that only from a broader 
philosophical-theological perspective can we give full meaning to the whole 
immanent that is science. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The situation in which theology and science do not have any points of 
contact and seem to ignore each other, is all the more dramatic because of the 
fact that “nothing is more dangerous of the ignorance of a problem, if not the 
ignorance of a solution” (Koyré 2018, 15). The main idea of the theology of 
science project is to avoid such a risk and offer a new opportunity for dialogue 
between theology and contemporary science.  
From analysis of the basic ideas of the theology of science result four main 
proposals for the discipline. 
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The first one concerns the problem of the temporal dimension of scientific 
progress. There are many thinkers who propose a philosophical analysis of the 
nature of empirical theories, of the objects that they describe, but also on the 
nature of scientific evolution (Marcacci 2018b, 205-218). From the current 
philosophical reflection on science, contrary to the standard view of science 
dominating in the first half of the 20th century, it appears that scientific theories 
are never absolute and given once and for all. If scientific theories change, then 
the world they describe also changes. Unlike the metaphysical theories of the 
past, the ontologies proposed within the philosophical discourse on science 
rather have a local and non-comprehensive character, therefore the question 
remains about the use of different local (partial) ontologies within the 
theological reflection that should recognize the fact that scientific rationality is 
expressed contextually, historically. 
Secondly, it seems that what remains fundamental for theological reflection 
is not so much the specific way in which an empirical data is described, but 
rather the fact that nature presents itself as understandable, intelligible. In fact, 
in Heller’s thought one can note the importance of the Logos (sense), which 
consequently leads to the search for a coherent world view, which is called by 
Heller as rationality/mathematicality of the world. This unifying theological 
vision would involve different cognitive contributions and would remain open 
to constant changes, showing the dynamic character of our world view. In this 
context, theology must start from Revelation and speak about science with its 
language, indicating the areas that the scientific method does not recognize (e.g. 
the problem of creation). Therefore the second proposal concerns the in-depth 
study of the theological concepts of the world in their historical-conceptual 
development, in order to better distinguish in them the invariant elements (a 
revealed datum) from the variant ones (historically conditioned). This proposal 
assumes the hierarchization of theological statements. In other words, not all 
theological truths are as important and unchangeable as dogmas. 
Thirdly, it should be noted that the discussion on the nature and purpose of 
the theology of science, provided by Bugajak and Szczurek, went in a very 
promising and profitable direction, in the sense that it reveals the attempt to 
provide some suggestions of an epistemological nature to establish the theology 
of science. Going in this direction, it seems that the main question to be 
answered is: “how to build the theology of science?”. It would be too naive to 
find the answer by proposing only case studies, or by trying to provide the 
theological interpretation of some scientific data. In fact these are not lacking in 
the field of Science and Religion. But case studies are often limited to some kind 
of “fragmentary” work and could lead once again to problems related to the 
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“God of the gaps” argument. Therefore, the third proposal suggests a 
specification of how the methodology of the theology of science should work in 
order to be able to dialogue with the problems of today’s science (e.g. the 
problem of intelligibility, causality and scientific explanation). One may intuit 
that in this context that the theology of science could be interpreted as the critical 
analysis of the conditions of possibility of philosophical and scientific thought. 
In other words, it seems that the theology of science could be interpreted first of 
all as the critical analysis of the foundational paradigm present in science and 
philosophy (Grenz and Franke 2001) and as the consequence can cause 
widening the perspective of human rationality (Giostra 2019). This critical 
approach would not necessarily mean philosophical/theological relativism or 
scepticism, but would bring the opportunity for a fruitful, dynamic dialogue 
based on the fact that for theologian the Universe is vestigium. The problem of 
the intelligibility (comprehensibility) of the world is certainly to be further 
investigated (de Regt 2017). 
Fourthly, theology of science can bring about a return in philosophy to a 
sort of optimistic and realistic idea of human existence in the world (Woźniak 
2007, 67-70). It is because theology of science offers the type of rationality that 
is the result of act of accepting in trust God’s Revelation. On the contrary, 
modern philosophy was born as the consequence of systematic doubt. Therefore 
theology can help philosophy and science discover contemplating and receptive 
nature of human reason. Theology as the science of sense can save human reason 
from the slavery of its own categories, concepts, laws and teach us how ask new 
questions and patiently look for answers. 
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